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EMPIRICISM AND VAGUENESS[1]

THE purpose of this paper is to show that the following propositions are implied by the empiricist theory of the origin of concepts:

(1) Vagueness is in principle unavoidable.
(2) In regions of vagueness the law of the excluded middle becomes inapplicable.
(3) Not all universals embodied in the real world can be precise.
(4) The pragmatic thesis that meaning lies in the future is correct.
(5) Philosophy can not be a true science.

In the first section we will make more precise than has so far been done the empiricist theory of the origin of concepts; in the second section we will consider the nature of vagueness; and in the third section we will demonstrate the five propositions just enumerated.

I

The empiricist theory as to the origin or source of concepts is that all concepts are either derived from experience or constructed out of concepts which are derived from experience. *"Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu."* However, empiricists are not very clear as to what the phrases "source of" and "derived from" mean. Presumably they are not to be taken in a psychological sense, for even the rationalist admits that experience is required to bring out or elicit concepts. These phrases must, then, have some logical sense. It has been suggested by Russell that they may be understood in terms of ostensive definition,[2] though, since Russell fails to develop a theory of ostensive definition (he merely says it involves denotation or pointing) his view is not much more precise than the traditional one. What is needed, if we are to define empiricism in terms of ostensive definition, is a theory as to what ostensive definition is. This I propose to develop now.

[1] Presented before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Sarah Lawrence College, February 21, 1946.

[2] *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 368.

The common view of ostensive definition may be illustrated by an example. Suppose I point to the cover of a book (which is, as a matter of fact, red) and say that anything is red if it has the same color as this book. This is not an adequate ostensive definition of the generic concept of redness for two reasons. In the first place, it does not really define redness, for it has not been established ostensively how close in shade to the denoted sample a color needs to be in order properly to be called red, e.g., the oranges have not been eliminated ostensively from this definition. In the second place, the proposed definition is not entirely ostensive, since the more generic concept of color was used in the definition. If I had merely pointed to the book and said "this," one would not know whether I was ostensively defining redness, this shade of red, the concept of a book, or some other concept applicable to this particular book.[3]

Now ostensive definition, as the name implies, is definition in terms of presented instances, rather than in terms of already defined concepts. We have just seen that a single instance will not suffice, since it embodies many qualities, so that one presentation can not determine which one of them is being denoted. These can be eliminated in the process of ostensive definition only by presenting other instances that lack them but to which the concept to be defined ostensively is applicable. Thus if one is ostensively defining the concept of a chair, he must point to iron chairs as well as to wooden chairs, so that it will be clear that he is not defining "wood." In other words, it is essential that not all of the instances of the class to be defined belong to any sub-class of that class, for otherwise the ostensive definition will not distinguish between the class and the sub-class.

Since every class, except the universal class, is the sub-class of another (broader) class, ostensive definition would be ambiguous if nothing further were done. For every correct application of the concept "chair" is also a correct application of the concept "furniture." The converse does not hold, however, and this fact must be made use of to eliminate ambiguity from ostensive definition. It is necessary that cases to which the word does *not* apply be presented (these we shall call counter-instances). If one indicates that the concept "chair" is not applicable to a davenport, etc., the limits of the extension of "chair" may be shown ostensively.

[3] It should be noted that if there are specific concepts, e.g., a concept of an absolutely specific shade of red, then the first objection would not hold against the ostensive definition of such concepts. The second objection is valid, however, for the concept of a specific shade of color would have to be employed in the definition.

In ostensive definition, therefore, objects are divided into two classes, those to which the concept applies and those to which it does not apply. Ostensive definition is a classification, the making of a distinction. It follows that negative concepts are as well defined as positive concepts.[4]

II

A non-ambiguous word is said to be vague when one who is well-acquainted with its standard meaning can not determine whether or not it is applicable to a certain case, which under these circumstances is called a borderline case. Vagueness thus manifests itself as a type of indecision. Some might amend this definition so as to include those situations where different (but presumably well-trained) users disagree as to the uses of a word in a particular case, even though in each person's mind there is no question as to how he would use the word in this particular case. But such a situation, it seems to me, is an example of ambiguity rather than of vagueness; for clearly each observer is using a different criterion of applicability for the word. Furthermore, if the term which is used has been carefully defined ostensively for each observer by the presentation of the same examples and counter-examples, this situation will not arise; so in our discussion of vagueness we shall not cover this type of case.

It is well known that certain concepts are vague. These may be concepts which have been carelessly or hastily defined, or concepts that derive their utility from their vagueness. No attempt has been made to define precisely such concepts as "some,"

[4] The fact that ostensive definition of a concept requires the presentation of both instances and counter-instances seems to imply that a term applicable to all objects or situations can not be defined ostensively, and hence would appear to be meaningless on an empiricistic criterion of meaning. Such terms as universal, particular, quality, instance, subject, and many sets of ontological categories would fall under this ban. One who rejects metaphysics would probably maintain that we have reached a desirable conclusion, that such terms should be rejected from philosophy as meaningless. There are two important objections to this course of procedure, however. In the first place, the term "time" must be similarly rejected, for time is present in every denoted situation; but clearly we know the meaning of such a term. In the second place, since any formulation or statement of ostensive definition involves terms applicable to all objects or situations, it would seem that we can not ostensively define all the terms required to describe ostensive definition. For it does not seem possible to define ostensively the terms, "instance" and "quality," or "particular" and "universal," which are needed in any ostensive definition, since ostensive definition is definition of a universal in terms of its instances.

Thus the empiricist who rejects metaphysics finds that he also rejects concepts needed to state his theory of meaning, and the empiricist who doesn't finds it a real problem to define metaphysical terms.

"many," "high," "bald," etc., since these concepts are so useful just because they are vague: they can be applied easily by unskilled users without careful consideration. We shall not be concerned with such terms, however, but shall rather deal with the terms of a technical language which have been carefully defined as precisely as possible. Technical philosophical terminology will, of course, be included in this category. Hereafter, when we speak of vagueness, it is to be understood that we are speaking of that vagueness which arises after careful definition.

It might be thought that the restrictions just placed on our discussion eliminate all possible sources of vagueness. That this is not the case can be shown from our analysis of ostensive definition. The significance and utility of a concept derive from its generality or universality, i.e., the fact that it may be applied (positively or negatively) to an unlimited number of situations. A concept may be used to classify any object or situation presented in the future into one class or another, and so is in principle applicable to an infinity of objects. But an ostensive definition is unavoidably limited to a finite number of presentations. Hence borderline cases may arise. If meaning is defined in terms of ostensive definition the possibility of vagueness is unavoidable, since it is impossible even in principle to define a term ostensively so that it will cover all possible situations. The converse side of the principle that concepts are ultimately definable only in terms of instances is the principle that the denotation of a class-term is subject to vagueness. There are, of course, conceptual "universes" in which there is no vagueness. Such are the universes of discourse of the logician and the mathematician. These universes are not vague, because they are limited to idealizations. Numbers, as such, are not vague or imprecise; but counting is subject to vagueness, for counting is always of some particular kind of object, and the definition of that type may be vague. It is in the application of concepts to the real universe that vagueness may arise. Because of this it is possible for the rationalist to argue that ideas are really clear in themselves, and that it is only owing to our confusion in the application of them that vagueness arises. But for the empiricist, who conceives of ideas in terms of their ostensive definition and hence in terms of their applications, the possibility of vagueness must always remain. I do not mean to imply that in application all concepts are vague. A naturalist, for instance, may never meet a borderline case with respect to some natural species. This analysis, then, does not show that every concept applicable to the real world is vague; it shows only a logical possibility, not a metaphysical necessity. What kinds of entities are to be met with in experience is

a question of fact and can not be determined *a priori* by logic. It is actually the case, I think, that most concepts applicable to the real world are vague.[5]

Before going further we must distinguish quantitative vagueness, or numerical imprecision, from qualitative vagueness; and we must then subdivide qualitative vagueness into two kinds, what I shall call linear vagueness and what I shall call non-linear or multi-dimensional vagueness.

Numerical imprecision is a well-recognized feature of scientific measurement. The result of any measurement is a number of limited accuracy. If a technician measures a given length with an instrument capable of reading to one thousandth of an inch, he will express his result as, for instance, 1.414 inches. He might just as well have expressed it as the square-root of 2. He may, of course, be able to use a more refined technique which will show that the length is closer to one figure than the other. By making a number of such measurements with the same instrument he can not only improve his accuracy but, by applying well-known laws of distributions, can determine what degree of accuracy his result has. Still, whatever technique of measurement he employs, he will at any one stage be left with a finite number of significant figures, and beyond that his results are imprecise.[6] There is no way of distinguishing between rational and irrational numbers in measurement.

Linear vagueness is best illustrated by means of qualities which

[5] Ordinarily borderline cases cause little practical difficulty, for when they are met with they are generally dismissed with some such comment as "Let's not split hairs," and the term used is redefined in such a way as to make its applicability (or non-applicability) to the situation at hand unquestionable. The development of science involves a constant redefinition of terms so as to eliminate vagueness from them, but since science is constantly revising its results anyhow this process meets with little opposition. The case is different in the law courts, however, where laws enacted in one period must be applied to situations arising during a later period. The problem as to whether or not a corporation was to be treated as a person was really a question as to the definition of a term. It is the function of the courts to answer such questions, and it is done (of necessity) with a good deal more arbitrariness than is generally admitted. The courts are not allowed to recognize vagueness in the application of the law; every case must fall either within or without the scope of a given concept. It is in the region of borderline cases that the courts are inevitably law-makers.

[6] It was formerly thought that science could increase its accuracy without limit. This would require a constant redefinition of terms. The concept of length as applied, for example, to a table is not sufficiently precise to be meaningful beyond a certain point. Even so, Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy shows that in certain realms there is a limit to the accuracy that can be attained.

form a continuum, such as the colors of the color spectrum. One may define blue ostensively by presenting objects of various shades of blue, and counter-instances of various shades of purple and green. Since it is impossible to detect color differences beyond a certain point, borderline cases, such as blue-greens, will arise. The similarity of linear vagueness occurs because of limits in matching one quality with another, while quantitative imprecision occurs because of limits in matching one quantity with another (the length of a table and the length of a ruler, for example). Both of these types of vagueness are linear in that the various qualities (such as colors) and the various quantities (such as lengths) involved may be arranged in a linear series, except, of course, for the borderline cases. The important difference between these two types of vagueness is that the quantities involved in the one type have a common measure, whereas the qualities involved in the other type do not; we can say of one length that it is twice another, but though the wave-length of red light is fifty per cent greater than that of violet light, no significant units can be applied to the color qualities themselves.

The third type of vagueness is called non-linear because it arises in connection with qualities which are such that their instances can not be ordered linearly. The concept of chair is an example, since it is impossible to arrange chairs and non-chairs in a sequence like that of the colors of the spectrum. How much of a back does a chair need in order to be a chair rather than a stool? At what point does an article of furniture cease being a chair and become a chaise longue? Various features are involved in being a chair, and a piece of furniture may be a borderline case because it lacks one or another of these, or because it has them all but not to a sufficient extent. Since one can not give these various features weighting factors (it would be arbitrary to say that having a back is one-third as important as having a certain length of seat, for instance), it is clearly impossible to arrange chairs and non-chairs in a linear sequence. It is true of many qualities that there is no single identifying trait involved, but only a number of such traits which are present in various degrees in different instances of the concept yet present in lesser degrees or absent in the counter-instances.

III

We can now derive from the empiricist theory of the origin of concepts the five propositions mentioned in the beginning of this paper. Formulated in terms of ostensive definition, the empiricist theory is that all concepts are ostensively definable or constructible

out of concepts which may be defined ostensively. Our first proposition, that vagueness is in principle unavoidable, has already been demonstrated. One can never define a concept ostensively with sufficient precision so as to eliminate the possibility of borderline cases.

Our second proposition is an old one, namely, that in regions of vagueness the law of the excluded middle can not be applied. If an object is a borderline case with respect to a predicate, it is arbitrary to say either that the predicate, as ostensively defined, applies or that it does not apply to the object. This does not mean that the law of the excluded middle is false in such cases, but only that it is inapplicable, there being no criterion for applying the definition of the concept.

The fact that some propositions lack significance because of vagueness does not, of course, affect the significance of other propositions having the same form and involving the same qualities. But it raises an interesting question concerning the status of universals for the empiricist, who defines meaning in terms of ostensive definition. If one takes the view that a concept in the mind corresponds to or is knowledge of a universal which may be embodied in particular existent things, how shall vagueness be explained? We can not say that a thing is a congeries or set of universals, such that of any universal the object either participates in it or does not; for then all instances would either have the universal or lack it, and vagueness would never arise. The empiricist may deny that there are any genuinely vague concepts, but such a position contradicts experience. So he is driven either to conceptualism, a denial that there are universals embodied in things, or to that extreme form of realism which holds that participation in a universal by an object admits of degrees. On the latter view vagueness can be explained by saying that in a borderline case the degree of participation is very slight. Our third proposition follows, then, namely, that an empiricist can not consistently hold to the view that all universals embodied in the real world are precise universals.

The fourth proposition is that the existence of genuine vagueness is a justification of the pragmatic doctrine that meaning, in some sense, lies in the future. Everyone admits that future experience clarifies one's ideas; the debatable point is whether this is a psychological fact or a logical necessity. Our analysis of ostensive definition shows that it is in some instances logically impossible to define a term antecedently so as to preclude any possibility of vagueness. In the cases of quantitative imprecision and linear vagueness one can, in principle, draw a line dividing the series of

objects or numbers into two groups. (Such a procedure does not eliminate vagueness, of course.) But in these cases future experience will not aid in eliminating vagueness by bringing about a redefinition of terms. This is not so in the case of non-linear vagueness, however, and I think there is a genuine sense in which we can say that future experience may bring about a clarification of the borderline cases and hence a change of meaning of the concept involved. Let us consider an example. The Greeks held that the principle that the whole is greater than any of its proper parts applies to all numbers. This principle is not true of transfinite numbers, for the equality of such numbers and certain of their proper parts may be taken as the definition of transfinite. We can not say that the Greeks were wrong, however, in believing that their principle applied to all numbers; the Greek concept of number was sufficiently vague to leave open the question as to whether transfinite numbers were to be included within the scope of what they called number. Today it is sometimes denied that transfinite numbers are really numbers, on the ground that though they have some of the properties of finite numbers they do not have all of them. This seems to me to be a question of definition, and since the theory of transfinite numbers was not known to the Greeks it was inevitable that their conception of number was vague in this respect.

At the time a term subject to non-linear vagueness is defined one can not tell exactly wherein the vagueness lies. If he could, he would be in a position to redefine the term so as to eliminate the vagueness. To eliminate all possible vagueness from a concept at the time it is defined would require a knowledge of all possible experience, and this is beyond the scope of man. It would be, I suppose, a property of an omniscient God that just as he could foresee any event of the future, so his concepts would be crystal clear, lacking any fringes of vagueness. Since for man the actual world of experience is not completely laid down, however, he can not eliminate vagueness from all his concepts. This is the sense, then, in which the realm of concepts is an open world, in which the passage of time affects its contents. The borderlines of vague concepts can be clarified only as experience proceeds.[7]

[7] Pragmatism, as formulated by Peirce, states that a meaningful concept is one which in principle is applicable to an experienceable situation. Peirce said that it follows from this that the clarification of a concept is achieved by considering its conceivable effects or instances. He failed to observe that this clarification requires the presentation of those instances which are borderline cases. A concept would never be clarified, though one's understanding of it would probably be increased, by the consideration of non-borderline instances.

The fifth, and final, conclusion concerning empiricism that we will draw has to do with the subject-matter of philosophy. Philosophers have lately been much concerned as to the status of their subject. In particular, they wish to explain why it is that there is little agreement on fundamental issues in their field. In this respect philosophy stands in poor contrast to the natural sciences. Hence it is inevitable that comparisons be made between the two and the question as to how far philosophy is a science receives much contemporary attention.

The natural sciences clearly have attained their successes by definitely limiting their subject-matter. In fact, if this were not so the question just raised would not exist; for if the successful methods of the natural sciences were directly applicable to every kind of subject-matter they would long ago have been applied to philosophy. Philosophic subject-matter is fundamentally different from that of the sciences, and hence the method of science is not directly applicable to it. One respect in which philosophy differs from the sciences is, I think, the extent to which its terms are vague.

The well-developed natural sciences of our day are quantitative. Measurement is, of course, subject to numerical imprecision, or what we called quantitative vagueness, but this type of vagueness is not as consequential as the other types, since it is amenable to quantitative treatment, i.e., it may be minimized and its limits computed by means of the mathematical theory of errors. There are, of course, many examples of qualitative vagueness to be found in the application of scientific terms. But since philosophic problems can not, in general, be treated quantitatively, this type of vagueness is far more important for philosophy. It is more difficult to define in a precise manner the concepts of philosophy, such as "substance," "truth," "liberty," "reason," "*a priori*," etc., than it is to define the terms of natural science, such as "mass," "energy," "length," "potential," because the former are subject to non-linear vagueness. The ostensive definition of such evaluative terms as "right," "good," "desirable," is particularly difficult. This is shown by the problems involved in translating such terms. Thus to learn with greater precision what certain key Greek terms, such as "*psyche*," "*paideia*," "*moira*," mean, scholars have made careful studies of Greek culture centered around these words and their applications.

This difference between the terms of the natural sciences and those of philosophy may be illustrated by means of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke assimilated this distinction into his dualism by placing the primary qualities outside the mind and the secondary qualities inside the mind. His

purpose was, in part, to place the primary qualities in nature, where they would be within the province of the physicist, and to exclude the secondary qualities from nature, so that the scientist would not have to be concerned with them. But it is not because the primary qualities are in nature that the scientist deals with them, nor is it because the secondary qualities are in the mind that he neglects them. The validity of science does not rest upon such a metaphysical basis: science was not undermined when Berkeley demonstrated that the same arguments used to prove that secondary qualities are in the mind can likewise be used to show that primary qualities are in the mind. The reason the scientist deals with the primary qualities is that they are quantitative, and admit of precise treatment; and the reason he excludes the secondary qualities is that they belong to the realm of the vague. Descartes' view that the primary qualities are distinct, the secondary qualities confused, comes closer to the truth than does the Lockean conception.

The natural sciences deal with the quantitative and precise features of reality, whereas philosophy, in contrast, deals with the qualitative and vague aspects of reality. This is an important difference between philosophy and science. It accounts for some of the lag of philosophy behind the natural sciences, and it must be taken into account by any view which regards science as the ideal structure of knowledge or which attempts to adapt the method of the natural sciences to philosophy.

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COMMON SOURCES OF VALUE IN THE ARTS AND EVERYDAY LIFE

THE result of many esthetic theories unfortunately is to set the artist up as a race apart with whom those who practice the ordinary activities of man can have no common bond. The artist's work, it is said, produces for him its own values and satisfactions which can not be obtained in any other activity, and which can only be obtained by men devoting at the least their spare time, and perhaps their lives, entirely to art. The performance of the ordinary activities of men, so runs the theory, gives them no satisfaction; they must turn in some other direction to find the meaning in life. Yet there are expressions in common speech which seem to indicate a belief that the ordinary worker does at times find significance in his work, and even shares some of the values experienced by the professional artist. Thus we speak sometimes of an individual's work as "a work of art," such as a general's battle, a

conception of government, or, more humbly, a new bridge or a teacher's class. Of course, one might say that such uses of "art" are merely figurative uses elevating the worker to a height he can never really attain; but actually I feel they are very near the truth of the matter.

I should like to show in this paper that art is rather a manner of doing things, an attitude toward work, than a definite profession or finished product of some kind. A painter is not then an artist because he paints pictures, but because by so doing he has managed to organize his medium in a way that expresses some view of his of the world. His interest has been in this organizing, this painting process, because in this way he has derived a certain self-satisfaction, certain values that make him prize his profession as giving meaning to his life. These values he would not have obtained if he had painted from an interest not in the painting itself, but in the prestige or wealth that might result from his finished picture. Yet men in any profession will find they can obtain self-satisfaction when they carry on that profession from an interest in it itself, in its problems, in mastering its materials as well as possible, rather than in the ulterior results of their work; and that satisfaction will be of the same kind as the artist's in his work. It is then this distinction between working because of an interest in the work itself and because of whatever gain may be expected to be realized from it that differentiates the artist and the mere worker regardless of what profession they may be engaged in.

A definition of "art" is usually determined by the delineation of the subject-matter considered, and it is the inclusiveness of this delineation that will decide much as to the applicability of the entire theory. Thus many esthetic theories concern only the fine arts (some, indeed, only painting), and often only the objects produced by them, and the conception of art derived from them is too narrow to include the more unconventional examples of art I mentioned at first. The definition of "art," as of most other words, is partly a matter of choice; if someone wants to talk about art and means by "art" only painting, that is his privilege. Often, however, though the definition may be arbitrary, it is not obvious to the individual making it how arbitrary it is; and he may be led to make dogmatic statements about all art, which if the original view of art is too restricted may have unfortunate consequences. Thus beginning only from the objects of the fine arts it will be difficult to include the satisfaction produced by more everyday activities, and the artist as a result becomes separated from other workers. To arrive at the wider conception of art that is the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to include types of activity whose products

would not ordinarily qualify for the title "work of art," and see if some conception of the artistic process can not be derived from such a consideration. Several examples of these activities are presented in the next section.

I

First of all, there is the case of a man, a writer of technical publications, who thought of himself—privately—as an artist. One might have considered him a hack, writing detailed explanations of various complicated pieces of radio equipment for the army or engineering concerns. In such work he had first of all to be thoroughly acquainted with the equipment he was explaining as well as with the basic principles underlying the operation of any radio set. He was, besides, working under definite limitations, the nature of his subject-matter, the deficiencies in background of his readers, and various arbitrary stipulations that he had to meet, such as length, a definite outline stating how many paragraphs the book would have and in general what each would contain. Yet starting from so many given conditions he still had enough freedom to make a distinctive book, something whose style and organization in spite of the predetermined outline could express something of his own personality.

This writer believed that there were two important sources for his satisfaction in the finished book: the fact of having organized *all* elements of his material for the best solution of his problem, and his absorption in that material. The fact that the book was complete he believed to be a necessary element in his satisfaction; for he felt his problem of presenting a theory could not be solved by omitting any relevant facts. At the same time he realized that completeness was not enough, that mere inclusion of all the facts would not make a successful book; there had also to be organization, and for him "organization" was practically synonymous with "structure." The organization of all the facts, with no irrelevant ones, in a logical, coherent order seemed to him to be the structure of his work. The organization further involved its communication to the reader, if not the sense of organization itself, at least the relation between the ideas so that the reader would be carried from point to point. For this reason literary style could not be neglected.

Accompanying this satisfaction with the best organization for his purpose was the writer's absorption in his material. He organized his material in terms of the logical relations between its elements. His interest was not personal, nor in the material for its practical uses, cost, or other such aspects. Rather, he became interested in the qualities and relations inherent in the equipment

he was explaining, the relation of different parts to the function of the set as a whole, the relation of particular parts to each other, and the unique characteristics of each. Thus the writer found himself working divorced from personal aims and considerations, working outside himself guided by external objects and relations.

A second case of a man thinking of himself as an artist was a radio engineer designing radio receivers. His problem was not merely to build a radio receiver, but to build a receiver with better tone quality and sensitivity than a competitor's within a given price range, say $35. Besides designing a set that would serve his specific function he was limited by other conditions, the nature of the materials themselves, and specific restrictions such as the size of the finished product, patent rights not available to the designer, the necessity of using standard parts, and the physical difficulties of placing parts of odd shapes within the set. He utilized his knowledge of the principles of his science, his previous experience, and the results of experimentation until he felt that he had designed the best set possible under the given conditions. Since his final design indicated the relation of parts that best fulfilled the given function, changing either the function or the conditions restricting the design would have necessitated a change in the relation of parts, and also given him more or less freedom to effect this change. His design was the result of an exploration of all the different elements and their combinations and directed the use of each element where the designer believed it to be best fitted. Each element had its place, there were none that could be omitted without affecting the set and none interchangeable for the better. The resulting radio set, by no means a structure built without limits, was determined by the designer's aim, the conditions within which he had to work, and his desire to build the best set possible under those restrictions.

As a last example, let us consider a teacher of a class in philosophy. He was faced first of all with the need to unify the subject-matter he was to present. He was limited, not only by the general nature of the subject, but by deficiencies in his students' preparation, by the time they had available for reading, by the need to tie this class and this particular topic in with past and future classes, and especially by the fact that all this had to be done in a one-hour period, which meant that his discussion had to be limited to a few essential points. He had to see that his hearers comprehended the unity of his subject and felt the relative importance and coherence of the several concepts involved. Fixing one point, then another, he made his students move step by step to an awareness of the whole. He was conscious of this process, con-

scious not only of weaving together the threads of his subject, but of gathering up the members of his class and unifying them with his presentation of the subject to make a unified pattern. The structure of his class was not merely the outline of his lecture as he had written it down, but was inherent in his presentation of his material and included the reactions of the members of his class, unfolding as that class progressed. It was principally to his skill and judicious choice that he owed the organization of his subject, so that the whole theory and the separate ideas were grasped by the class; however, the teacher had not only a sense of organizing ideas, but of shaping, of welding together ideas and people. When he was most successful he was conscious only of matters other than himself: his ideas, the expression of them, the response of his pupils. His hearers may have been exhilarated by the class, remembered it not only for its content, but perhaps even more for the skill in organization and presentation, for the teacher's complete devotion to his work. As for the teacher, he knew how well he had done his job and when he had a good class; having done his job particularly well, he said to himself, "That class was a work of art"—and he was right.

II

The important common features of all these unusual works of art are: (1) the producer is working to fulfill a definite function; (2) he accomplishes his aim by introducing the appropriate kind of organization or structure into the materials he is dealing with, whether they are radio parts or ideas; and (3) this structure is delimited and in part determined by a set of external conditions, the nature of the materials he is handling, and other more arbitrary stipulations. Not only are these features important in the activities I have already discussed, but they are also, I believe, the important ones in the work of the fine artist. This I shall try to show later. The fact that I have been using "organization" as almost synonymous with "structure" indicates the universality of structure, that it is in a sense the form of practically all human activity. Any activity, other than the most rudimentary, must have some organization or structure if it is to be other than a set of random movements; for each kind of activity, with the different materials used and the different outcome to be achieved, there will be a different kind of structure. In the cases I have discussed there are three different kinds of material that must be organized, "must" because a box full of electrical parts is not a radio receiver, any more than a page covered with words or phrases is a paragraph. Further, to say that structure is limited by external

conditions means no more than that there is a specific structure for a specific situation, although this structure may be an instance of a kind of structure, just as the plans of two different houses are alike in being house plans but are different as the two houses are different.

Although the presence of some structure is a necessary part in carrying on the activities I have been discussing to some definite end, it is not by any means sufficient to make their products works of art. Even in the most haphazard of products there will have been some organization, some structure. It is only by making the *best* product that the worker has approached the artist. For example, the teacher can be either a drudge or a teacher in the full meaning of the word. He can either spend the hour reading aloud the outlines of a system without troubling to see whether or not his class can follow him, technically doing his job, or he can be the teacher who enables his class to follow or even anticipate him as he unfolds his subject and feels that his class is as much a part of him as his emotions or sensations. The difference between the best or artistic product and the ordinary product involves a difference in the structure of the two. The ordinary product will not make the best use of the available material, its construction will not involve selection of the best of the material to use and the materials will not be combined in a way that best fulfills the function. In the technical book, for example, the ideas may merely be written down to present the facts; no attempt being made to build up to the main point, to have the proper emphasis placed on subordinate points, to make the reader feel the logical connection between the points, and to make it as interesting reading as possible. The structure or organization of the best product will contain all the required elements and none that are superfluous and not related to the remainder of the structure. What is "best" in each case is determined by referring to the function of the final product as it is modified and limited by whatever secondary conditions exist; it is a further test of the maker's skill, for he must have a complete knowledge of his product, know precisely what it must do, and be able to know when he has a product that will do that.

It is in the making of this "best" product that the worker has found an esthetic satisfaction. It has required the organization of objective materials, manipulating ideas or mechanical objects best utilizing the material he is working with, which requires not merely putting the elements together in any superficial way that to some extent fulfills the desired function, but a thorough investigation of the qualities and potentialities of his material. It is

an impersonal task at which he becomes absorbed in his subject and can disregard personal considerations. The non-artistic worker does not find this fascination in building a coherent structure out of objective materials, but, rather, would find his job a necessary evil. The worker who finds a satisfaction in building a structure for its own sake, will by so doing obtain self-expression, though it may not be the degree of self-expression which he would obtain if he were working for that end alone; but the necessity of achieving an objective function like that served by the technical book or radio set requires selecting and choosing elements and determining ways in which they can be combined, and the selection and choice will be an expression of the worker just as is every one of his judgments and valuations.

The fact that the worker can find an esthetic satisfaction in his work does not imply that the observer will find his products esthetically pleasing or consider them as works of art. Frequently, there will be only a limited number of persons who will have the detailed knowledge to appreciate the care that has gone into his work. A book on higher mathematics may be an excellent technical book; but most of its readers, who will be few enough to begin with, will be able to read it only for its content, which, after all, is the reason for which it was written. Those who have such a grasp of the material as to leave them free to observe the way in which the book is written will be able to judge and appreciate the author's work. Then they would be able to derive esthetic satisfaction from the manner in which the author expressed the subject-matter, from the order and arrangement of the ideas, rather than from an understanding of the content of the book. The author obtains his satisfaction by means of the product or structure he creates; whether or not others can obtain esthetic satisfaction in addition to technical information is for him a secondary consideration.

III

So far I have hardly mentioned "fine arts," by which term I mean those pursuits familiarly called "arts"—painting, literature, music, and the like. But I believe that a closely parallel discussion can be followed for them, although there are several important differences. An analysis of the three examples I gave earlier in this paper brought out several common features of those activities, common to most others for that matter, especially the organization of some type of material for a definite purpose. I believe the work of the fine artist will show the same features, with his pleasure, again, obtained from the creation of the "best" structure in each

case. The work of fine art is a creation made with perceptual material, tones, words, colors, or forms, to express some idea of the artist's. The unity of the product and the fact that the work of art is a creation means that the worker or artist in these cases has organized his material, introduced some structure into it.

The structure developed for each kind of work of art is determined by the qualities of the particular medium concerned, whether it is the relationships between colors and masses, or those between tones and melodies. In every art with the possible exception of painting it is obvious that organization has occurred. Sometimes the representational qualities of painting may cause one to overlook its structure. However, one of the visible differences between a painting of a scene and that scene itself is the fact that the painting is *a* painting, a whole which is comprised within the frame of the picture, whereas the original scene was not a unity. Any unity in the view is imposed by the observer if only by a casual and arbitrary limitation of the part of the view he is to observe. A photograph is given unity by a somewhat backhanded method of selecting from a given landscape those portions which seem to follow conventional principles of composition in painting. There have been enough discussions of principles of "form" in art without my having to go into them here. Without any exact determination of the principles of form, it remains that, in painting at least, "form" usually covers the conventional methods by which contours, masses, colors, and lines are ordered and disposed to make the unified picture that is the artist's expression of the scene he observes. In fine art, as in the common activities I have discussed, each work will have its own particular structure determined by the specific conditions under which that work is made, although they will be instances of the general rules of organization for each kind of art.

The activities described in the first part of this paper had in each case a definite practical function; the attainment of self-expression was not the primary aim of the activities, but was obtained by the worker in the course of making his product. For the worker in the fine arts, however, not only is there self-expression and personal satisfaction obtained in the process of working, but it is the end for which he is working, the function of his product. The artist achieves satisfaction by manipulating a medium, by placing form and structure in an objective material so the resulting product expresses an idea or emotion which he apprehends more clearly, perhaps, than others. His self-expression comes about through his making the product; as he works and develops his theme his expression becomes more complete and more explicit until

when he is finished (and he himself best knows when he is finished) the end of the process has succeeded in tying together all of the threads of the theme and given a unity and finality to his expression. His materials are of such a nature that not only can he express some view of his own of the world by their manipulation, but the completed structure can communicate his feelings to others. The work of art is a product with a definite function, its manufacture expressing the artist's feelings, and the product itself communicating those feelings to the beholder.

The particular media the fine artist is working in enable him to have more profound and far-reaching expression than the worker who is constructing a machine; both the artist and the worker express themselves to greater or less degree and both experience the same kind of satisfaction in the result. However, the artist's medium has a greater flexibility and scope and also can communicate his expression to others, so giving him a greater range and depth than the ordinary worker. In addition, the artist has a single-mindedness of purpose, expression, which the other can not have since his expression is only the indirect result of the making of a product with some wholly different function. It is the expressive function of finished works of art, what they express and how they express it, that is often treated in books on esthetics, and this is not surprising, since the expressive function of the finished work is one of its most important aspects.

In the case of the fine arts, as in the case of the practical activities, the mere organization of the material is not sufficient to produce a work of art. In the latter case, it had to be the "best" organization, the best for the particular problem concerned. So with the work of fine art; painting a picture does not necessarily make its painter an artist, unless it is among the "best" that can be painted. There is the same division in the fine arts between those who merely make things, a painting or a building without any feeling for the object they are producing, and those who carry on that work for an interest in it for its own sake.

To accomplish his purpose in making the "best" work of art, the artist must have a thorough knowledge of his medium and derive the form of his works from the qualities of that medium, choosing those qualities for development which will yield the form best suited to the expression he is working toward. He must have a complete knowledge of its character, of its qualities, and a deep insight into its potentialities. If he follows conventional rules for his particular art form, such as in music and painting, he does so because he recognizes that they express certain natural qualities of the medium. On the other hand, the painter who paints pic-

tures, but is not an artist, would follow those rules because most painters have done so and because they usually produce acceptable results. He would order his shapes and colors without having made a complete investigation of them in each case or having an adequate realization of their use for expression. The satisfaction of achievement is reserved for the artist who has the profound interest in his materials and attempts to use them to their best advantage in relation to the end he has in mind.

IV

The essential distinction in all the pursuits I have described is between the man producing goods with his only interest in the possible ulterior uses of his product, and the one producing objects for the interest they have in the work of making those products, whether it be a good radio or a good painting. It is such an interest that leads them to make a good product, an interest in the materials they are working with, an interest in their obscure as well as their obvious properties, and an interest in trying to unify those materials in view of the end they have set themselves. This distinction pervades both common activities and fine arts, and has similar results in both, pictures or radios that show no originality or thought and are merely acceptable products, as contrasted with pictures and radios which are recognized as the best in their field, a masterpiece in the one case, a great accomplishment of the engineering profession in the other.

The interest and satisfaction of the worker or artist in his work can come only when he is interested in the making of his product, and when he is making what he considers the best product. Whether this product will be accepted as good by others depends upon his innate ability, training, or similar factors. However, though his work be rejected by others, it will still seem good to the artist, and afford him satisfaction; and products finally accepted as good by the world will have been judged to be good by the man who made them. The good artist has a profound interest in his art for its own sake, and loses himself in working with words or ideas or in exploring the hidden expressive possibilities of colors. The creative process will give him the same kind of satisfaction that the engineer or teacher experiences in losing himself in his subject-matter. It is a satisfaction that can not be obtained by the painter or writer or teacher who is working only with the end in view of praise, or of profit, or of merely finishing an appointed task.

Working for the sake of the satisfaction obtained by such work will have the result, important for the world at large, of making

products of higher quality. If it is a radio set that is being built, it will be a better radio. This may not be so important except to those buying a radio, but the same result will follow for all activities, such as teaching and governmental work. In the latter case, a more effective administrative structure would result, and, above all, a greater concern of those in authority with the welfare of the people dependent upon them—since their work consists in looking after the interests of those people.

But the most important result of such an attitude toward work is the value to be derived by the individual doing the work, making it possible for him to obtain those values it is too often thought that only the professional artist can obtain. The practice of the fine arts can then be related to common activities, if it is true, as I have tried to show, that the procedure the fine artist uses is the same procedure used by any worker in doing a good piece of work. The artist has obtained his values by organizing his medium to produce his intended result, the worker his values in organizing *his* material to his end. By recognizing their common qualities of workmanship they will both be able to produce better work and derive more satisfaction from it. It is such a satisfaction that can be one of the chief joys of life.

CHARLES A. FRITZ, JR.

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK

BOOK REVIEW

Reliable Knowledge. H. A. LARRABEE. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1945. vii + 685 pp. $3.50.

Professor Larrabee's book is the issue of twenty years of academic experience, "the last ten of them spent in teaching a course called 'Methods and Problems in the Social Studies,' which is required of all undergraduates in the Division of Social Studies . . ." at Union College. It has had an embryonic existence in the form of two mimeographed editions. In the Foreword, Larrabee salutes his teachers at Harvard and Columbia, especially Dewey. Among his Harvard teachers he mentions C. I. Lewis, but the Harvard influence that moulds this book is not the formalistic pragmatism of Lewis, rather the romantic practicalism of William James, with its doctrine of the transforming power of belief and sympathetic insight (Hocking's influence also?), especially on the level of social transaction. Tincture such a view with the more scientific spirit of Dewey's naturalism, involve it a little with the incipient subjectivism of "philosophical anthropology" and psy-

cho-analysis, and you have Larrabee's general position. (Without the scientific leaning, it would be quite like the philosophy behind Jacques Barzun's *Teacher in America,* romantically individualistic.)

The theory of reliable knowledge issuing from this position is tense with an unresolved dichotomy—the "inner-outer" opposition conceived in terms almost of traditional dualism. The first two chapters are about man as knower "from the outside" and "from the inside." Larrabee is half aware of the metaphorical element in these expressions, but nevertheless he never quite catches up with the sense of Dewey's literal interpretation of them, as the difference between "knowing" experiences and simply "having" them. For Dewey there is, consequently, but one general method of *knowing* reliably, that of formulating the conditions of the occurrence of the given (*any* given) in socially testable ways. For Larrabee, there are *two* general methods the double-barreled functioning of which produces reliable knowledge, the "mechanical" and the "historical." These "patterns" he strives at times to conceive as two phases of a single fundamental method, but they continue to fall apart under his treatment. On the one hand, we have the mechanical pattern (chapters 10–13), conversant with "inert" and "empty" and "cold" general facts, classes, strict and statistical causality, averages, "objective" measurement, etc. This is looking at things *ab extra.* On the other hand, there is the imaginative or sympathetic re-living of the "inner" life or states of beings of other times or places. This is the historical method, the view *ab intra* (chapter 14), with its "value-drenched" facts, unique, precious, private, and "residing in the individual," warm with subjectivity and vital drive. Though Larrabee's main purpose is to soften the contrast between these two views, the outer and the inner, by a kind of mélange, he not only makes the distinction in a Bergsonian way, but also, like Bergson, shows a bias in favor of the subjective or the "historical" (*élan vital*), as against the objective and mechanical. Again he does not *want* to do this, and it is perhaps a studied resistance of this sort that makes him eschew even mentioning Bergson, in a large book that refers the reader to an enormous number of less significant thinkers who less adequately express Larrabee's spirit. Of course, William James is an avowed influence, but the rapport between James and Bergson is well known. Why was Bergson left out of the picture?

One can almost hear Larrabee answering this (with his usual excellent eagerness and concern) by saying that the spirit of his thinking is *not* Bergsonian. That is why Bergson does not figure. And he points out the many passages in his book celebrating the

objectivity of the mechanical pattern and emphasizing its necessity as a complement of the historical. But the whole book is in effect an improvisation around the note sounded on page one of the Foreword, concerning improved thinking "especially about human social relationships" and the triviality of courses "expounding the conditions of perfect consistency." So formal logic (Aristotelian, not mathematical) gets a curt nod (chapter 3), and at the end even of this chapter most of the quotations for class discussion are calculated to make one distrust formal logic. And since formal consistency is a poisonous virtue of the natural sciences, Larrabee tries to neutralize this ancient poison in them by making them as "practical" (vital) as possible. By a kind of assimilation into the dynamics of human purpose and need, the mechanics of scientific method is saved from the stagnation of its otherwise "inert" forms and formalism. Thus the discerning reader of this book detects an inclination to historicize all the disciplines, in the name of vitality. (The social "studies" are concerned with so vibrant and viable a subject-matter that they are saved from being "sciences."

But Larrabee is indeed anxiously aware that this way of saving the mechanical method, by swathing it in the velvet immediacy of felt values, makes objective or reliable knowledge problematic if not impossible in principle. The problem is especially acute for him, since he began by associating objectivity with scientific method (the mechanical pattern) in the narrow sense of quantitative formalism. In *this* sense, one seems under a strange obligation *not* to be objective in his thinking. James accepts this result with candor. But Larrabee can not. He is half committed to the less romantic Deweyan position. So he explores (still anxiously) the possibility of *historical* explanation or theorizing that will be in *some* sense objective (pp. 513–522). He says that "to be read, history must be written with fire and conviction," and the context shows that he wants to say that the writing must be fiery and convinced in order to be *true,* in some important sense of the term. He comes out of the exploration of this sense of "true" with the announcement that the "ultimate test" of such truth is "philosophical" (p. 526), and this is said to involve profound self-knowledge. " 'Know thyself' is still the last word in the testing of our explanatory historical theories" (p. 527). So the subjective emerges as the final determinant. But Larrabee tempers this at once with the reminder that "the one essential qualification of the historian is the spirit of critical inquiry" (p. 527). He knows very well that, for the would-be theorist, subjectivity is itself an ancient poison.

As to the "philosophy" which is to serve as the ultimate test for historical (or what W. K. Wright calls "magnanimous") thinking, the reader gets two irreconcilable impressions of its function: it seems on the one hand to express a wide cultural bias or ethos, such as general pessimism or optimism; on the other, it seems to serve as a corrective for this sort of thing, by universalizing or "objectifying" the theory. Larrabee paints an impressive picture of the tension between these conflicting conceptions, but gives no solution of it. He warns us against the relativistic fallacy of the "sociology of knowledge" (pp. 521–522), yet his own analysis partly warrants it. We are left with a distressing choice: either "a scientific detachment which mutilates its subject-matter," or "a sympathetic understanding which destroys all objectivity of judgment" (p. 602). His account of value-experience makes it seem intrinsically the sort of thing that puts man into this painful predicament, in the darkness of which one can hear Larrabee whistling, as if his book were a light and a solution, showing the way out.

In one important sense, *Reliable Knowledge* is indeed illuminating. It is the articulation of the experience of a very humane person, poised with the ballast of wide acquaintance with different quarters of the field of human life. The "naturalism" emerging from this, and formulated in this book, makes up in right-minded contagion what it lacks in power to hit upon correct analyses of theoretical difficulties. Throughout the book shines a spirit of inclusiveness and moderation which, particularly in our time, is a virtue devoutly to be sought and cherished where found. . . .

Why, one wonders, was Larrabee not satisfied with such a position as the following: some of the "things" in the universe are sentient and intelligent. This means that their behavior is "caused" by such factors as purpose, aspiration, emotion, appetite, in addition to the "physical" causes such as bodily impact, gravitation, etc. In "explaining" the behavior of living things, particularly men, one can not be too careful about taking such non-physical (non-mechanical) motives into account. Since this involves many dependent and compound variables (purpose, etc.), explanation on this level is a delicate and difficult task. But the *form* ("pattern") of the procedure, where genuinely explanatory, is that of *any* explanation. Something occurs (an eclipse, a murder). You ask, why? and eventually answer by pointing to antecedents connected with the event in question by a confirmed generalization in the form of an implication. Or, if you want the why of the generalization itself, you attempt an analysis of its terms that will "show" the connection, as a consequence of a wider

generalization. And you do indeed need to know whether a man is angry, or in love, or dreaming, if you are to explain his behavior. But the explanation does *not* involve yourself being angry with his anger, or loving with his love, or dreaming his dreams. To "live" through these things with him (and this is indeed possible) would be simply to *have* the experiences of anger, etc., over again (or perhaps for the first time). The "why" of their occurrence might still be in question. Also, some beliefs do indeed "modify their subject-matter" *through the agency of the believer* (not directly), but such influence is itself to be explained, if at all, in the same old way, by formulating the conditions of its occurrence in the social tissue of experience.

A general position such as this is thoroughly naturalistic, and Larrabee espouses it. But he confuses it, and confounds the reader, by adding to it the Bergson-Mannheim notion of knowledge-by-having-experiences (sympathetic communion, insight). The latter may be the method of making you *feel* what you talk about in particular instances, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of reliable *knowledge*. . . .

After the first three chapters, on man as knower from the outside and inside and on formal logic, there are chapters on observation, facts, the rise of hypotheses and the earmarks of good ones, how to clarify hypotheses (three chapters including one on semantics), how to test hypotheses under the mechanical pattern (three chapters), one on science and the social studies, leading to the crux of the book in the chapter on the "historical" pattern. The book concludes with three more chapters, on the combined use of the mechanical and historical patterns in law and government, prediction of events, and reliable knowledge of values. Appended to each chapter are quotations for class discussion and generous amounts of case material. At the end of the book are questions and exercises for review, perhaps more helpful from the student point of view than the case material and quotations.

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH

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BOOK NOTES

The Pure Theory of Law. WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1945. xii + 211 pp. $2.50.

The philosophy and theory of legal science known as the Pure Theory of Law was initially stated over thirty years ago by Professor Hans Kelsen. Kelsen remains the chief figure in, and con-

tributor to, this Neo-Kantian movement in law, but the theory has been developed further and applied to special fields of law and to problems in the theory of government by Alfred Verdross, Adolf Merkl, Josef Kunz, Frantisek Weyr, Fritz Schreier, Felix Kaufmann, and others. Despite the maturity of the movement and the quantity of writing that has been done both by the school and about the school, the present work by William Ebenstein, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, is, with the exception of Kelsen's own book, the first full length analysis in English of this philosophy. It is an excellently clear statement of the position and is particularly valuable because Ebenstein, having familiarized himself with Anglo-American jurisprudence, presents the doctrines of the school in the context of this non-continental type of thought. The force and accent of the doctrines are thereby more readily conveyed to the English reader.

Methodologically, the pure theory of law is an attempt to apply Kantian principles to the theory of law. The Kantian principles used, however, are such only as modified by the strong positivistic developments of Neo-Kantianism and as further modified by elements of phenomenological philosophy. It is Kantian in two senses: it operates within the framework of Kantian distinctions, and it applies the transcendental method to the concept of law. Illustrative of the first is the adoption of the category of "ought" for norms and the radical separation of the "Is," the realm of nature and experience, from the "Ought," the realm of norms. The second use of Kantian ideas is found in the kinds of questions with which the theory is concerned, questions of the presuppositions of law, of how law is possible, of the transcendental validity and unity of law.

Within this Neo-Kantian and phenomenological framework, Kelsen and the others have done important and fruitful thinking. Despite the one-sidedness of a study of law only in formal terms, such an analysis has its legitimate place especially as it is carried out by this group of writers. Kelsen and his co-workers are not only aware of, but invincibly opposed to, the surreptitious derivation of contentual norms from formal propositions. They are opposed to the whole natural law tradition, the essence of which is precisely to deduce legal norms from concepts not derived from positive law. It is in this sense that members of this school are positivists. They are "critical positivists," however, in that they insist on the normative dimensions of law. In general their approach to law is not only realistic, but is functional, dynamic, anti-substantialistic, pluralistic, and relativistic. They are as conscious as the realists in American jurisprudence of the essential

nature of legal process with its indeterminateness, its purely conative elements, its dependence on time, place, and circumstance for its nature and development. Most of the theories developed by this philosophy of law—the "tension" theory, the doctrine of the "calculus of error," the theory of "attribution," and, of most importance, the "step and stairs" theory of law—attempt to formulate systematically these existential features of law such that these hitherto unrecognized features are seen to be necessary attributes rather than embarrassing defects in "perfect" law.

The fundamental weakness of the pure theory of law is its persistence, despite criticism, in treating law as a normative subject-matter, yet one to which teleological considerations are irrelevant. They are not irrelevant, for in law function controls every element of structure, and to ignore this is to introduce an irritating systematic ambiguity into the analysis.

E. N. G.

Zweifel und Erkenntnis. Ueber das Problem des Skeptizismus und den Begriff des Absoluten. SVEN EDVARD ROHDE. (Lunds Universitets Årsskrift. N. F. Avd. 1, Bd. 41. Nr. 4.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. Lepizig: Otto Harrassowitz. 1945. 250 pp. 12 kr.

The earliest radical scepticism recorded by the history of Western philosophy is ascribed to Gorgias of Leontinoi. Nothing exists, Gorgias affirmed. But if something existed it could not be known, nor, if known, could the knowledge of it be communicated. Even if we refuse to take this hyperbole seriously we may consider it revealing that the sophistic negator of knowledge belongs in the lineage of the Eleatic school with its doctrine of absolute Being. The alliance of the Absolute with the idea of radical doubt, attested by this episode in Greek thought, forms the theme of the persent book. The author, analyzing Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, shows how these philosophers tried to overcome scepticism by basing knowledge upon the Absolute. The order of treatment is determined by logical rather than historical considerations. So the writer ventures to describe Spinoza's monistic doctrine of the divine substance as a consistent and clarifying development of Kant's *Kritizismus* (p. 84). But aside from a certain arbitrariness in selecting and arranging his material the author goes through his academic exercise with remarkable skill. The result is negative. The idea of the Absolute, the analyst concludes, is untenable and consequently the attempts made by Descartes, Kant, and the others to vanquish radical doubt by means of the Absolute end in failure. "It follows that knowledge is not

knowledge and veridical because of its being proved nor because of its being knowledge of the Absolute. But it is knowledge and veridical just as it is given [*vorliegt*] with its varying content" (p. 24). The writer, I gather from this somewhat veiled statement, decides not to doubt and so makes philosophy unnecessary—for himself.

H. K.

Philosophy of Business. RUPERT C. LODGE. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1945. xiii + 432 pp. $5.00.

This book is labeled "philosophy for the business man, practical business theories for the philosopher," on the dust cover. Philosophers can not afford to buy it at the price, and the business tycoon interested in philosophy, if such there be, might have some trouble understanding the exposition of philosophy. The really successful part of the book is the part on business, not the one on philosophy. Particularly from Chapter VIII on, the exposition of ways of business thinking, realistic, idealist, and pragmatic opportunist, is quite good. The illustrative material is both interesting and helpful. If not philosophy, it is good social psychology.

The classification of philosophers as realist, idealist, and pragmatist would not be too bad in itself. But then the author tries to explain that Bertrand Russell, for instance, is a realist, and John Dewey a pragmatist, because everybody says they are. But by Professor Lodge's own definitions here given, Russell is quite clearly the pragmatist, as a positivist and metaphysical skeptic; while Dewey is the idealist, "driven by an idea" and unwilling to accept passively things as they are. It is not, I think, true that philosophers are so individual that, worse than the angels of Saint Thomas Aquinas, each is a species all by himself. Classification is the beginning of knowledge, here as in all fields. But we can not be satisfied by the conventional labels. If Professor Lodge had cast these labels aside, or followed accurately his own definitions of them, it might have produced a book novel and illuminating to the philosopher reader, and completely confusing to the business man dipping into philosophy. But even as it stands, all the book, including many clever little insights in the notes, is worth reading for its suggestiveness, most of all by one who knows enough philosophy to question the author's interpretations.

H. T. C.

NOTES AND NEWS

We regret to learn of the death of Herman H. Horne, Professor of the History of Education and the History of Philosophy at New

York University until his retirement in 1942, at Leonia, New Jersey, on August 16, at the age of 71.

The Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, seeks a qualified assistant professor or instructor, also three graduate teaching assistants, for immediate appointment, the work to begin not later than September 23, 1946. Please send application or information to the Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles 24, California.

The Third Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics will be held at the Chicago Art Institute, Chicago, Illinois, on September 5, 6, and 7, 1946.

Fellowships for graduate study or research for 1947–1948 are offered by the American Association of University Women, to be awarded to candidates who have completed two years of residence work for the doctor's degree, or who have already received the degree. There are 17 national fellowships and 8 international fellowships, including a fellowship for a Latin American woman to study in the United States. Also the Northwest Central Fellowship of $2500 will be awarded as a recognition of distinguished achievement. For detailed information concerning these fellowships, instructions for applying, and the conditions of acceptance, address the Secretary, Committee on Fellowship Awards, American Association of University Women, 1643 I Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Individual applications will not be received for the Special Achievement Award.

Virgil C. Aldrich of Wells College has been appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy at Kenyon College.

Barnett Savery has been appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia.

W. H. Roberts will go to Morningside College as Professor of Psychology.

Archie J. Bahm, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Texas Technological College, has been appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Denver.

Ivan Little, formerly Freshman Lecturer in the University of Nebraska, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at Texas Technological College.

Edwin N. Garlan, Instructor in Philosophy at Columbia University, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Reed College.

Carlton W. Berenda, Professor of Physics at Massachusetts State College, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma.